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I. Executive Summary 
 
The EU has long been criticized for its democratic deficit. Several proposals for overcoming or 
reducing this deficit have been made. Some of them mention the role of more citizen participation 
and direct democracy. It was in this spirit that the ECI found its way into the Constitutional Treaty, 
creating the first tool of transnational participatory/direct democracy. It is aimed to give the Unions 
citizens more influence on EU politics while maintaining the institutional balance - especially the 
initiative monopoly of the European Commission - of the Union.  
 
The ECI is binding in that sense that the Commission has to take legislative action once an ECI is 
admissible. However, it is not obliged to simply pass the unchanged ECI text on to the other 
institutions. Constitutional/treaty amendments can be proposed by an ECI, but for reasons of clarity, 
this should be made explicit in the implementing law/regulation. ECIs can also be submitted to 
influence the CFSP. 
 
There are several theoretical options of putting the ECI into practice. Among the reviewed ones1 
only the amendment of the Constitutional Treaty (e.g. in the form of a mini-treaty and the enactment 
by a regulation) could be recommended. A regulation could and must be based on Art. 308 TEC. 
Both options create legally binding forms of implementing the ECI, unlike the self-binding options 
of an inter-institutional agreement or integration into the rules of procedure of the Commission. This 
implies that citizen initiatives would have the possibility to seek redress before the ECJ and that 
binding standards for member states could be set. 
 
The mini-treaty option is preferable compared to regulation. However, if the constitutional deadlock 
of the Union continues, an ECI-regulation should be enacted. 
 
 
 
                                            
1
  Waiting for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, amendment of the Constitutional Treaty, amendment of the existing 
treaties, enactment by a directive / regulation, enactment by an interinstitutional agreement and integration into the Rules of Procedure 
of the European Commission. 
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II. Introduction 
 
For half a century, Europe has been the concern solely of political elites. The citizens role has been 
limited to one of a spectator - only being able to observe the actions of heads of state and govern-
ments. This method of European integration has reached its capacity, as has been clearly demonstra-
ted by the process of drafting and ratifying the Constitutional Treaty.  
 
A new approach of allowing citizens to shape the future of the European Union is needed. In a 
limited way, the Constitutional Treaty tries to reflect this reality. Article I-47 (4) of the Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe creates (for the very first time) a transnational tool of 
participatory/direct democracy. 
 
It reads: Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to 
submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is 
required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution. European laws shall determine the 
provisions for the procedures and conditions required for such a citizens´ initiative, including the 
minimum number of Member States from which such citizens must come.2 
 
This clause is commonly to be referred to as the European Citizens Initiative (ECI). There are two 
main arguments favouring the ECI: Participation and (citizens) integration. The ECI is regarded as 
a device for citizens to be able to, at the very least, influence the agenda, if not the decision-making 
of the EU. The citizens will be granted the same legal footing as the European Parliament and the 
Council regarding initiative rights. On the other hand, many ECI-supporters hope that it will lead to 
the establishment of transnational public debates and movements. The integration of countries shall 
be complemented by an integration of the citizens. 
 
Due to the outcome of the referenda in France and the Netherlands the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty is not yet possible. A civil society campaign has therefore been launched to 
implement the ECI independently of the Constitutional Treaty.3 
 
The central aim of this study is to evaluate legal options for implementation of the European Citi-
zens´ Initiative (ECI) below the constitutional level. This study will first provide some background 
information on the history of the ECI. Rules in form and rules in use of citizens  ´ initiatives in 
European countries will also be briefly summarized. The legal nature of the ECI  especially the 
question of the Commissions obligations and the possibility of treaty-amending ECI´s  will be 
analyzed in more detail. The study concludes with a recommendation of how to implement the ECI. 
The eight existing citizens initiatives referencing Art. I-47 can be found in the appendix. This is 
rather remarkable, as this instrument does not yet have a legal existence. Beyond the scope of this 
study, however, is the question of referenda regarding European affairs.  
                                            
2
 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States: Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CIG 
87/04, 6.8.2004. 
3
 See www.citizens-initiative.eu. 
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III. ECI  Background information 
 
III.1 History of ECI 
 
Claims that the EU has a democratic deficit and that it is crucial for the EUs future to strengthen 
its democratic legitimacy have continued to arise for at least 20 years. For the greater part of its 
history, citizens have not been at the centre of the European political system. One response to this 
was the establishment of the Citizenship of the Union, in addition to national citizenships. The 
Maastricht Treaty (1992)  Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)4  has integrated 
the Citizenship of the Union into the Treaty of Rome. The rights granted to the EU citizens include 
the right of free movement, the right to vote in communal elections in all Member States, the right 
of diplomatic protection and the right to petition to the European parliament. These rights were 
regarded as a first step towards full-fledged citizens rights. The concept of the Union Citizenship is 
dynamic.5 Art. 22 TEC provided for threeannual reports by the Commission that could form a basis 
to complement the Citizenship of the Union by the Council and subsequent approval of the Member 
States. Thus far, the Commission has presented four reports.6 However, none of them referred to 
new instruments of participatory or direct democracy. The question of whether Art. 22 can be used 
as a legal basis for an ECI regulation will be reviewed in the sections to follow. 
 
In the run-up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996 the then foreign mini-
sters Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) and Lamberto Dini (Italy) proposed a right of submission to the 
European Parliament. If 10% of the electorate in each of at least three Member States would have 
submitted a political proposal drafted in the form of articles the European Parliament would then be 
obliged to consider that submission.7 However, the timing for such an instrument proved to be 
inopportune; the IGC refused to agree on it. 
 
Prior to Schüssel´s and Dinis proposal, the European Parliament had expressed its support for 
strengthened political rights of citizens several times. Starting very cautiously in 1988, with the 
reference to the role of political participation in the political process and highlighting specific 
consultation on legislative matters, as well as mentioning the role of the (national) political parties8 
the Petitions Committee 2002 proposed - with regard to the deliberations of the constitutional 
convention - to upgrade the right to petition to a right of submission whereby changes to the com-
munity legislation could be initiated by petitions.9  This would have been constituted a form of a 
mass petition  an instrument legally situated between the right to petition and the right of initiative. 
One year later the Committee emphasised that the current constitutional setting of the Union does 
not allow for Initiative and Referendum.10 In 2004, the Committee declared the rights of petition and 
complaint to the Ombudsman as direct democracy.11  
                                            
4
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community: Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325/33 
 184, 24.12.2002. 
5
 Kluth, W., in Calliess, C./Ruffert, M. (eds.): Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 2002, Art. 22 EGV, RN 1. 
6
 KOM (93) 702; KOM (97) 230; KOM (2001) 506; KOM (2004) 695. 
7
 Agence Europe Nr. 6823 vom 2.10.1996. 
8
 European Parliament, Resolution on the procedures for consulting European citizens on European Political Union, Doc. A2-106/88, 
17.6.1988. 
9
 Europäisches Parlament, Bericht über die Beratungen des Petitionsausschusses in der Sitzungsperiode 2001-2002 (2002/2019(INI)), 
A5-0271/2002, 17.7.2002, p. 6. 
10
 Europäisches Parlament, Bericht über die Beratungen des Petitionsausschusses in der Sitzungsperiode 2002-2003 
(2003/2069(INI)), A3-0239/2003, 19.6.2003, p. 5 
11
 Europäisches Parlament, Bericht über die Beratungen des Petitionsausschusses in der Sitzungsperiode 2003-2004 
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Proposals from social scientists and civil society groups to overcome or reduce the democratic 
deficit by participatory/direct democratic means were also made. The German political scientist 
Heidrun Abromeit proposed the establishment of a set of direct-democratic instruments - mainly 
veto rights (territorial and sectoral veto) and mandatory referenda in case of new treaties and treaty 
amendments.12 The Austrian lawyer and political scientist Michael Nentwich argued for a 
European indirect popular initiative - one that is very similar to the Swiss citizens initiative. 3-4% 
of the electorate (or of the ballots cast in the previous European election) in at least five Member 
States can submit a proposal to the Council and the Parliament. If they refuse to enact the law, a 
European-wide referendum will take place. In concurrence with Abromeit, Nentwich is also in 
favour of obligatory referenda for changes in primary law.13 Several other scientists have also 
presented proposals for more direct democracy in the EU, although at times in a less concrete 
manner.
14
  
 
NGOs and civil society groups have proposed direct-democratic instruments for at least 15 years. 
The network Eurotopia argued for a European constitution which should be drafted by direct-
democratic means and should contain elements of direct democracy.15 The Loccumer Erklärung, 
drafted by a European network of citizen groups, proposed a right of submission to the European 
Parliament (1% of the electorate of at least three Member States would need to sign) and a Swiss-
type right of treaty-amending initiatives that would lead to a European referendum if 10% of the 
electorate in every (!) Member State signed an initiative.16 The most elaborate and detailed proposal 
for direct democracy in the EU comes from the network of European democracy movements - 
Democracy International. In their discussion paper, More democracy in Europe, they developed 
concrete proposals for a three-step citizen-lawmaking procedure and obligatory referenda in the case 
of transfer of sovereignty (e.g. to the WTO or the UN) and treaty/constitutional amendments.17 
  
It was therefore no wonder that the Convention preparing the Treaty establishing a European 
Constitution was eager to evaluate possible tools of participatory and direct democracy. In close 
cooperation with civil society organizations and after intensive discussions the presidium decided in 
its last meeting on June, 12th, 2003 to include the ECI in the draft Constitutional Treaty. The 
wording was based on Art. 192 TEC (the right of the European Parliament to ask the Commission to 
take legislative action). It was intended from the beginning that all issues within the framework of 
the powers of the European Commission could be tackled by an ECI. More details of the birth of 
the ECI can be found elsewhere.18 
 
In the subsequent deliberations and negotiations of the Intergovernmental Conference, there were 
three amendments to the text of the European Convention (where the ECI was Art. I-46 (4)): In the 
first sentence, the words who are nationals have been included. This makes it clear that only 
                                                                                                                                                  
(2004/2090(INI)), A6-0040/2005, 11.2.2005, p. 3. 
12
 Abromeit, H.: Democracy in Europe: Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity, 1998, pp. 95-135. 
13
 Nentwich, M.: Opportunity structures for citizens participation, the case for the European Union, in: Nentwich, M./Weale, A. 
(eds.): Political theory of constitutional choice, 1998, pp. 125-139. Nentwich also proposes a controlling petition referendum that is 
similar to Abromeit´s veto referenda. 
14
 Abromeit, op. cit., p. 118. 
15
 Kaufmann, B./Köppen, P.: The Rostock Process, 1991-2004: On the way to more direct democracy in Europe, 2001, p. 89. 
16
 Reprinted in Erne, R./Gross, A./Kaufmann, B./Kleger, H. (eds.): Transnationale Demokratie, Impulse für ein demokratisch 
verfasstes Europa, 1995, pp. 432-433. 
17
 Democracy International: More Democracy in Europe, 2005, http://www.democracy-international.org/fileadmin/di/pdf/papers/di-
more-democracy.pdf, retrieved on 23.10.2006. 
18
 Efler, M.: A Rollercoaster Ride towards Transnational Democracy, in Kaufmann, B./Lamassoure, A./Meyer, J. (eds.): 
Transnational Democracy in the Making, Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, 2003, pp. 47-49. 
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citizens who have the nationality of at least one of the Member States have the right to sign an ECI. 
Secondly, within the framework of its powers has been added, thus emphasising that an ECI is 
only possible where the Commission has the right of Initiative. And finally, it was made explicit in 
the second sentence of Art. I-47 (4) that the European law shall include the minimum number of 
Member States from which such citizens must come. 
 
III. 2 Citizen initiatives in other European countries 
 
In Austria, the experiences with the Volksbegehren19 are mixed. There are some indirect effects 
like agenda setting, mobilisation and influence on public debates. The direct effects  enactment of 
laws and definitive policy changes  are only limited. In 6 of 29 cases (as of 2002) citizens initia-
tives were enacted by parliament in total or in significant parts. On the other hand, even citizens 
initiatives with a very high number of signatures were completely ignored by the parliament. The 
addressment of initiatives was often considerably delayed.20 
 
Italy has much experience with its citizen initiative right which must be signed by 50.000 citizens. 
However, like in Austria, institutional hurdles play a decisive role in the success (or lack thereof) of 
initiatives ever being able to reach the citizens. Of the 213 popular initiatives submitted for legis-
lative approval, 29 have been enacted.21 In Spain, where the hurdle is much higher (500.000 citizens 
have to sign) a similar situation exists. 5 of 32 submitted initiatives have garnered sufficient support 
to even be subject to parliamentary debate  only 1 of those 5 initiatives was ever enacted.22 
 
Similar outcomes have been experienced in Poland. The Polish Constitution allows popular initia-
tives since 1999. The initiators must gather 100,000 signatures in support of the proposal: 
approximately 0,3 % of the total registered electorate. As of 2005, the procedure was used 55 times 
 however, legislation enacted by the parliament resulted in only 6 of those instances.23 
 
The limited range of issues able to be addressed by an initiative and the ultimate power of the 
legislature in determining outcomes are among the most important factors that have served to hinder 
the success of citizen initiatives. 
                                            
19
 The name of the citizens  ´initiative in Austria. 100.000 signatures (1,7% of the electorate) must be gathered. 
20
 Rehmet, F.: Volkspetitionen  Praxis und Wirkungen. Das Beispiel der unverbindlichen Volksbegehren in Österreich, Mehr 
Demokratie e.V., Diskussionspapiere und Untersuchungen, No. 16, 14.11.2003. 
21
 Vanzetta, Alexa: Non-binding citizen and regional initiatives in Italy, Mehr Demokratie (eds.), 2006, p. 20. 
22
 Cuesta, Victor: The Future of the European Citizen Initiative, in Kaufmann/Lamassoure/Meyer (eds.), op. cit., p. 74. 
23
 Anna Rytel: The Popular Initiative in Poland, Institute of Constitutional Law and Political Institutions, University of Gdansk, 
8.5.2006. 
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IV. ECI  the legal setting 
 
What exactly is the ECI? Is it binding for the Commission or not? Can an ECI be used to propose 
amendments to the Constitutional Treaty? What are the limitations of the ECI? These questions will 
be answered in the following section. 
 
IV.1 Nature of ECI 
 
It is imperative that the nature of the ECI is initially defined.24 The ECI, as it exists in the draft 
constitution, allows citizens to ask (or invite) the Commission to start a legislative process. This 
wording leaves open the legal nature of the ECI. It has already created some confusion among 
analysts of ECI regarding the role of the European Commission. 
 
It is quite clear that the ECI is non-binding for the Commission in the sense that it has to submit the 
ECI proposal unchanged to the Parliament and the Council.25 This would not be in line with the 
Commissions monopoly of legislative initiative and the wording of Art. I-47 (4). However accor-
ding to the majority view of European law experts and the effet utile of the ECI, it has a binding 
nature for the Commission in the sense that it has to take some legislative action on the topic pro-
posed by the ECI. The precondition is that the ECI is declared admissible.26 
 
It would be a misuse of citizens resources if the gathering of one million signatures would be 
without any consequence for the Commission. The very intention of the ECI is to give the citizens 
more influence on EU politics. It is therefore necessary that an admissible ECI has some result. This 
is not a contradiction to the Commissions initiative monopoly, as the Commission is not strictly 
bound by the content of the ECI. In this respect, it is very important that Art. 192 (2) TEC was the 
model for the drafting of Art. I-47 (4).27 Art. 192 (2) creates a right of initiative for an initiative or 
indirect initiative right for the European Parliament. This is a binding right. The Commission has 
to present a draft legal act, but is flexible regarding the timing and the content of its proposal. If the 
Commission refuses to act, the Parliament could take action for failure to act.28 The same applies to 
Art. 208 TEC that gives the Council an indirect initiative right.29 The obligation of the Commission 
is somewhat similar to the obligations Member States have with respect to directives: they are 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, but the choice of form and methods is left open to the 
national authorities (Art. 249 TEC). Analogously, the ECI has the same legal consequence. 
 
                                            
24
 The following remarks are based on the wording of Art. I-47 (4) Constitutional Treaty. They may not be valid if this wording will 
be changed.  
25
 Only Cuesta, op. cit., p. 72, seems to agree with a limited role of the Commission: once the initiative has satisfied these 
requirements, the popular request should be automatically passed on by the Commission to the lawmaking process. 
26
 Epiney, A.: Europäische Verfassung und Legitimation durch die Unionsbürger  Zu den Rechten der Unionsbürger in der 
Verfassung für Europa, in Kadelbach, S. (ed.): Europäische Verfassung und direkte Demokratie, 2006, pp. 49-52, citing supporting 
evidence and Fischer, K.-H.: Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag, 2005, p. 202 (views the ECI as a breach of the initiative monopoly 
of the Commission). 
27
 Meyer, J.: Questions & Answers about the new citizens right, in Filliez, F./Kaufmann, B. (eds.): The European Constitution - 
Bringing in the people, Contributions on The options and limits of direct democracy in the European integration process, 2004, p. 
26. 
28
 Kaufmann-Bühler, W., in Lenz, C.-O./Borchardt, K.-D. (eds.): EU- und EG-Vertrag, Kommentar, 2006, Art. 192 EGV, RN 9-10; 
Epiney, op. cit., pp. 49-52 citing supporting evidence; Kluth, op. cit., Art. 192, RN 9-11 citing supporting evidence (refusing only the 
interpretation that the Parliament could make a complaint for failure to act). 
29
 Kaufmann-Bühler, op. cit., RN 2; Epiney, op. cit., p. 52 citing supporting evidence; Kluth, op. cit., Art. 208, RN 3-4 citing 
supporting evidence, but also citing one dissenting opinion. 
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The Commissions obligation is therefore to check whether the formal conditions (number of 
signatures, number of countries involved, etc.) of the ECI have been fulfilled and that no conflict 
with European law exists. The latter would especially mean compliance with the boundaries of the 
European competencies and the Fundamental Rights of the Union.  It would be necessary that the 
Commission state its reasons in case of rejection.30 The Commission is obliged to take legislative 
action once the required number of signatures has been attained and the ECI is declared admissible. 
The implementing legislation should establish strict time frames for the matters subsequent 
treatment by the EU institutions. 
 
In any case, it is not possible to bind the Parliament or the Council because only the Commission is 
the recipient of the ECI. Even if the Commission fully approves an ECI, there is no guarantee that it 
will ever enter into force If the Parliament and the Council do not act, there is no possibility of a 
referendum on the ECI. This is different from the Swiss-style popular initiatives. However, despite 
its constraints, we do not foresee that the ECI will be rendered useless. Citizen initiatives in other 
European countries (see summary below) illustrate that it is possible to effect change. The success 
largely depends on the design.) We should also not forget that an instrument like the ECI is not 
necessarily apparent for all member states. States like the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
have no initiative rights at the federal level. Optimistically, the ECI could at least lead to the 
introduction citizen initiatives in some European countries. The Netherlands recently adopted such 
an instrument: 40,000 Dutch citizens are able to submit a political proposal to the parliament for 
deliberation on a given issue.31 
 
An ECI needs also to be differentiated from the existing right to petition. The right to petition is a 
request by an individual or a group of individuals directed to the European Parliament.32 It is rather 
designed for submitting complaints than to initiate legislation (though it could also be used in that 
way). 
 
In conclusion, the ECI is a right of submission or a indirect initiative right for the citizens. It is more 
than a mere petition right but less extensive than citizen lawmaking procedures like e.g. in 
Switzerland. 
 
IV.2 Amendments of the Constitutional Treaty 
 
Some analysts of Art. I-47 (4) Constitutional Treaty are of the opinion that an ECI could not propose 
constitutional amendments.33 The skepticism is based on the terms for the purpose of implementing 
this Constitution and legal act in Art. I-47 (4). Implementing could imply regarding the current 
constitutional setting as a status quo that should not be questioned by an ECI. Regarding legal act, 
it is reasoned that this refers exclusively to the legal acts in Art. I-33 of the Constitutional Treaty 
which did not mention the treaty revision clauses IV-443, IV-444 and IV-445 of the Constitutional 
Treaty. 
 
Such an interpretation warrants rebuttal. The term implementing this constitution could very well 
be interpreted as implementing all provisions of the constitution including Art. IV-443, IV-444 and 
                                            
30
 This should also be clarified in the implementing law. 
31
 Nijeboer, A./Pabst, R.: The Netherlands introduce Citizens initiative, http://democracy-international.org/dutch-initiative.html, 
retrieved on 23.10.2006. 
32
 Auer, A.: European Citizens Initiative, European Constitutional Law Review, 1 (2005), p. 80; Meyer, op. cit., p. 26. 
33
 Cuesta, op. cit., p. 72; Auer, op. cit., p. 29 (without further reasoning); apparently also Epiney, op. cit., p. 47. 
 10
IV-445. Only violations of the Constitutional Treaty are forbidden by this term if an ECI itself is not 
directed towards a constitutional amendment. It is also argued that this term has no autonomous 
meaning.34 With respect to the term legal act, it is necessary to note that there is no explicit 
reference to Art. I-33. It is generally agreed upon that more legal acts exist than are listed in Art. I-
33.35 The revision of the Constitutional Treaty  be it by ordinary or special procedure  is blatantly 
a legal act.36 It should also be noted that European countries with citizen initiatives excluding the 
proposal of constitutional amendments do so explicitly. Furthermore, it was not the intention of the 
drafters of Art. I-47 (4) to limit the ECI to a statutory initiative. Finally, it would be an overly 
restrictive approach to exclude constitutional amendments. The effet utile of the provision is to give 
European citizens more influence on European policy while maintaining the institutional balance. 
Excluding the most important legal form would surely be a departure from that goal. 
  
Based on the aforementioned reasons, Art. I-47 (4) does not exclude ECIs directed at amending the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
 
Politically, it would be a major shortcoming if ECIs were unable to propose amendments to the 
Constitutional Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty is very complex and regulates much more policy 
content than national constitutions do. Excluding such amendments would prevent European citi-
zens from participating in the most important policy fields. Should the citizens of Europe not be able 
to ask the Commission to propose such amendments? The example of the civil society campaigns 
invoking Art. I-47 (4) (see Annex) clearly demonstrates that constitutional matters are of crucial 
importance for citizens. The most publicly known campaign for a permanent seat of the European 
Parliament would have also required a treaty amendment. 
 
IV.3 Limitations 
 
Another (systemically logical) limitation is that an ECI has to respect the framework of the powers 
of the European Commission. The Commission has the right of initiative in nearly all of the policy 
areas where the EU has jurisdiction - and this is almost every policy area.37 This is also true for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and for justice and home affairs. The CFSP  which 
integrates the Common Defence Policy  is within the framework of the Commissions powers 
because Art. 22 Treaty on European Union (TEU)38 enables the Commission to take the initiative, 
the intergovernmental character of the CFSP notwithstanding. As does Art. 34 (2) TEU for the 
intergovernmental (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters)39 and Art. 67 (1) + (2) TEC 
for the community part of the justice and home affairs (visas, asylum, immigration and other 
policies related to free movement of persons).40 The fact that the Council or Member States also 
have the right of initiative does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an ECI would be illegal or 
outside the Commissions powers. One of the very few examples where the Commission does not 
have any right of initiative is Art. 190 (4) + (5) TEC that gives the European Parliament the sole 
                                            
34
 Epiney, op. cit., p. 49. 
35
 Hetmeier, H., in Lenz/Borchardt, op. cit., Art. 249 EGV, RN 3; Ruffert, op. cit., Art. 249 EGV, RN 1, 121. 
36
 In German constitutional law, all amendments of the constitution are laws, the need for special procedures and qualified majority 
notwithstanding. 
37
 Kluth, W., in Calliess/Ruffert, op. cit., Art. 250 EGV, RN 5. 
38
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union: Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325/5  C 325/181, 
24.12.2002. 
39
 The Amsterdam Treaty has extended the right of initiative to every area of the justice and home affairs, Nemitz, P.F., in 
Borchardt/Lenz, op. cit., Art. 34 EUV, RN 3; Brechmann, W., in Calliess/Ruffert, op. cit., Art. 34 EUV, RN 3-4.  
40
 Brechmann, op. cit., Art. 67 EGV, RN 1-2; Bergmann, J., in Borchardt/Lenz, op. cit., Art. 67 EGV, RN 3, 6 +7. 
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responsibility to draft a proposal for a uniform election procedure for the European Parliament and 
for the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the duties of its members. 
The same applies to the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the 
Ombudsman's duties (Art. 195 (4) TEC). An ECI on these topics would be illegal under the wording 
of Art. I-47 (4) of the Constitutional Treaty. Although, an ECI legislative proposal, independent of 
the text and form of the Constitutional Treaty, could broaden the scope to include these exceptional 
initiative powers of the Parliament 
 
An ECI - if it is not by itself directed to an amendment of the treaties - has also to respect the 
provisions of the European treaties, e.g. the limits of the Unions competencies, the institutional 
balance of the Union, or fundamental rights and freedoms established by the European Court of 
Justice.  
 
The exact scope of the ECI will be decided by the legal act chosen to implement it and will depend 
on subsequent practical experiences and court decisions. 
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V. Evaluation of different legal options 
 
The constitution has been rejected by the voters in France and the Netherlands. What does this mean 
for the future of the ECI? There are several options as to how to continue with the ECI. These 
options are:  
 
 Waiting for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty 
 Amendment of the Constitutional Treaty 
 Enactment by a directive / regulation. 
 Enactment by an interinstitutional agreement 
 Integration into the Rules of Procedure of the European Commission 
 
The principle pros and cons of each option, its legal admissibility and effect and the political 
consequences will be evaluated. 
 
Waiting for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty 
 
We do not expect the draft Constitutional Treaty to be ratified in the foreseeable near future. The 
Constitutional Treaty has been rejected by the voters and these decisions have to be respected. 
Therefore, waiting for the present text to be ratified by each Member State of the EU is not a viable 
option. 
 
Amendment of the Constitutional Treaty 
 
Another option might be the amendment of the current draft constitutional text. One possibility 
would be to concentrate on some of the undisputed institutional provisions of the treaty. The most 
detailed approach thus far has been proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy.41 He is in favour of a mini-
treaty that should focus on those provisions that are considered to be the most urgent institutional 
reforms. The ECI should be one of the priorities.42 The more far-reaching treaty amendments should 
be worked out by a large-scale convention coming into effect after the 2009 European Parliament 
elections.43 In Sarkozys proposal, however, it is unclear whether this should be an explicit 
component of the mini-treaty.  
 
This option seems to be somewhat more realistic than the ratification of the unchanged text. From a 
democratic point of view, this option could only be recommended if it is truly focused on urgent and 
undisputed institutional reforms and paves the way for a general treaty reform/constitutional 
process. It should not be used to bypass the French and Dutch voters and to introduce the current 
Constitutional Treaty through the backdoor. Once this condition has been met, it is an interesting 
option because it would give the ECI primary law status and it is a very transparent form of 
enactment compared to most of the options reviewed later on. For reasons of clarity and legal safety, 
the term for the purpose of implementing this constitution,44 should not be used in the mini-treaty 
(see IV.2). One could expect that such a mini-treaty could be negotiated quickly because it would 
                                            
41
 Sarkozy, N.: Speech to the Friends of Europe Foundation and the Robert Schuman Foundation, 8.9.2006. 
42
 The others are qualified majority voting/co-decision procedure, double majority system; election of the Commission President by 
the Parliament, strengthening of the subsidiarity principle, stable presidency of the European Council, Foreign Minister, enhanced 
cooperation and legal personality for the Union. 
43
 Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
44
 Or for the purpose of implementing this treaty. 
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involve re-using the provisions agreed upon by the European Convention and the IGC. It would 
require ratification in all Member States, including all countries that have ratified the Constitutional 
Treaty thus far. Realistically, this could not be achieved before 2009. 
 
This option is in principle very consequent. In the long run, a legal basis in primary law for 
participatory and direct democracy is definitely necessary. This is also common constitutional 
practice in Europe.45 It would create directly binding law for the Member States and could also 
legally empower citizens (groups) by giving them enforceable rights within the ECI procedure (e.g. 
a right to be heard by the competent institutions). 
 
Enactment by a directive / regulation 
 
The logical next option to be evaluated is an enactment by secondary law. Art. 249 TEC provides 
the most common legal acts of the Union: Regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions.46 In the following, only regulations and directives will be analyzed, as the other legal acts 
clearly do not fit with the aim of establishing a citizen-friendly ECI procedure. Decisions are 
binding but only suitable for the regulation of individual cases and, therefore, administrative and not 
legislative decisions. Recommendations and opinions do not have binding force and are therefore 
not appropriate. Regulations, on the other hand, are binding in their entirety and directly applicable 
in all Member States, whereas directives are only binding as to the result to be achieved and leave 
the choice of form and methods open to the national authorities. However, before analyzing the legal 
ramifications in further detail, the question whether or not it is legally admissible to enact an ECI-
regulation or directive must be addressed. 
 
Legal basis 
 
Every legal act of the Union needs a legal basis. The principle of conferral of competencies (Art. 5 
TEC) clearly states: The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. The crucial question is, therefore, whether 
such a legal basis exists in this case. European Law differentiates between special and general legal 
bases, whereby the special legal basis is preferred over the general one. 
 
There is no explicit legal basis for the ECI in the treaties. This would have been established with the 
Constitutional Treaty. The only other special legal basis could be Art. 22 TEC (see III.1).  The 
concept of the Citizenship of the Union creates rights similar to the ECI, especially the right to vote 
in communal elections in all Member States and the right to petition the European parliament. 
However, as previously mentioned, the extension of citizen rights depends on a Commission report.  
No Commission report hitherto mentions the role of direct or participatory democracy in general or 
more particularly in the form of a citizens initiative. Thus Art. 22 is not available as a legal basis.47 
No special legal basis exists. 
                                            
45
 For an overview on direct-democratic procedures and plebiscites in the constitutions of 32 European states see Initiative & 
Referendum Institute Europe: Guidebook to Direct Democracy in Switzerland and beyond, 2005 edition, pp. 228-260. From the 
countries with ECI-style citizen initiatives (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain) only 
Portugal seems to regulate this instrument by secondary law. In the Netherlands, the citizens initiative was included in the regulations 
of the parliament. If it had been fixed in law, the constitution would have to be changed too, which is very difficult in the Netherlands. 
46
 There are some other forms of legal acts - even with binding force  but they are beyond the scope of this study. 
47
 Even if there will be explicit or implicit reference of the ECI in a future Commission report, it will be a difficult means of getting 
ECI legislation enacted. The Commission has to present a proposal, the Parliament needs to be heard, and the Council has to decide 
unanimously. Then the proposal needs the adoption of all Member States. This adoption could be done by referendum, parliamentary 
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The ECJ has developed the implied powers doctrine. This is related to powers not stated 
specifically but are considered to be "reasonably" implied because the duties of the legislator 
implied the right to use means adequate to its ends. However, it would irrelevant to argue that the 
right of initiative of the Commission could not be used seriously without the ECI. Furthermore, the 
German Constitutional Court is quite sceptical regarding the applicability of the implied powers 
concept as a whole.48 Implied powers could not be used as a legal basis. 
 
European Law acknowledges of three general legal bases; Art. 94 and Art. 95 TEC and Art. 308 
TEC. Art. 95 and Art. 94, that has to role of a residual norm for Art. 95, are obviously not available. 
They serve to give a possibility for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common 
market. Because ECI has very little to do with Member States law this articles are not available. 
The question is whether Art. 308 TEC (Residual power) is available. It reads: If action by the 
Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, 
one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures. 
 
To qualify as a legal basis for a ECI-legislation, four hurdles have to be overcome: Art. 308 TEC 
should 1.) not be used for hidden treaty amendments, the measures have 2.) to be in the course of the 
operation of the common market, action 3.) should prove necessary to attain 4.) one of the objectives 
to the community. In the following section, each of the four qualifications will be analyzed 
individually. 
 
1.) No hidden treaty amendment: 
 
This qualification cannot be found directly in the text of Art. 308. It has been developed by the ECJ. 
Art. 308 has the ability to allow for the implementation of existing treaty objectives where no 
explicit powers exist. It should not be used to create new treaty objectives or to bypass the formal 
procedure of treaty amendments (Art. 48 TEU). It has to be used to complement competencies, and 
not to expand them.49 In a corresponding ECJ opinion regarding the accession of the EC to the 
ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), the ECJ denied the applicability of Art. 308. 
Current European Law does not provide the EC with the competence of accession to the ECHR. It 
was reasoned that the accession would lead to a new international law and a different institutional 
system. Such an amendment has a constitutional dimension and therefore a formal treaty 
amendment would be necessary.50 
  
Would this also hinder the possibility of an ECI legislation based on Art. 308? The ECI would not 
lead to a new international law system because it has nothing to do with international law (other than 
                                                                                                                                                  
decision or governmental approval depending on the content of the proposal, see Kaufmann-Bühler, op. cit., Art. 22, RN 2. This 
complicated procedure is perhaps the reason why the Unions citizenship has not been strengthened so far by Art. 22 TEC. The 
extensions adopted under this procedure would be part of the Unions primary law, see Kluth, W., op. cit., Art. 22, RN 6.  
48
 Calliess, C., in Calliess/Ruffert, op. cit., Art. 5 EGV, RN 14. 
49
 Bitterlich, J., in Lenz/Borchardt, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 2-3; Rossi, M., in Calliess/Ruffert, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 1-3, 52-
55; Schwartz, I.E., in von der Groeben, H./Schwarze, J. (eds.): Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der 
Europäische Gemeinschaft, Kommentar, 6. Auflage, 2004, Art. 308 EGV, RN 9-28; Geiger, R.: Vertrag über die Europäische Union 
und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 4. Auflage, 2004, Art. 308 EGV, RN 1; Streinz, R, in Streinz, R.  (ed.): 
Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 2003, Art. 308 EGV, RN 1-10.  
50
 ECJ, Assessment 2/94, 28.3.1996, Slg. 1996, I-1759. 
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European Law). It could also not seriously regarded as paving the way into a different institutional 
system. The institutional system of the Union as a whole will not be touched, it will be slightly 
modified. Only the Commission is obliged to act in an unspecified way (and that is also not a 
consensus view). The functions of the Parliament and the Council remain completely unchanged. 
Every ECI could completely fail if these two institutions refuse to act.  The same is true for the 
division of powers between the Union and the Member States The fact that the clear majority of 
European countries that have citizen initiatives have included this right in their national constitutions 
does not lead to the interpretation that the ECI has a constitutional nature. The constitutional 
systems of the Member States are different than that of the Union, in that the citizens initiative is a 
direct initiative right to be submitted to the national parliament that is empowered to directly decide 
whether it will adopt a citizens initiative or not. The ECI is an indirect initiative right directed to the 
Commission which  as already mentioned  has a lot of freedom in handling the ECI and stands at 
the beginning of a very complex lawmaking process. Furthermore, the fact that most countries have 
integrated their citizens initiatives into their constitutions seems to be more politically than legally 
motivated. Slovenia and the Netherlands demonstrate that it is not absolutely necessary to include it 
in the constitution. 
 
A ECI legislation would not be an illegal hidden treaty amendment. 
  
to be in the course of the operation of the common market 
 
The prevailing opinion in the literature is of the opinion that measures adopted under Art. 308 have 
to comply with the common market  they should not violate its principles. It is not necessary that 
they have a factual relationship to the common market or guarentee its functioning.51 The ECJ has 
even given the green light to measures regarding the external affairs of the community.52 This 
interpretation can also be supported in that Art. 308 is incorporated in the General and Final 
Provisions of the TEC, indicating applicability for all parts of the treaty. A narrow interpretation 
limited to the functioning of the common market would also deprive Art. 308 of its independent 
meaning, as it is already covered by Art. 94 und Art. 95. 
 
An ECI legislation would surely be in the course of the operation of the common market. 
 
If action by the Community should prove necessary 
 
It is important to clarify that Community action should not be objectively necessary but merely 
prove necessary53 in constituting a very significant difference. The necessity is given if there is a 
discrepancy between a community objective and its realisation. The institutions have very broad 
discretion. This discretion can legally only be challenged by the ECJ in respect to the appropriate 
exercise of discretionary power.54 Some commentators do interprete this condition as reducing the 
                                            
51
 Streinz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 19-21; Rossi, a.a.O, Art. 308 EGV, RN 23-24; Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 147-167, 
all provide further supporting evidence. Competing opinion Bitterlich, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 8, who sees this term as directed to 
the functioning of the common market. In this interpretation measures adopted on the basis of Art. 308 would need a factual 
relationship to the common market. 
52
 Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 160-161, citing an ECJ assessment that allows the applicability of Art. 308 in the field of the 
external relations of the Community, EuGH  AETR, 22/70  Slg. 1971, 263. 
53
 The German text is somewhat clearer: Erscheint ein Tätigwerden der Gemeinschaft erfoderlich 
54
 Streinz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 22-25; Rossi, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 26-29; Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 168-178. 
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chosen measures of the absolute necessity to fulfil the objectives.55 However, because they also 
agree in respect of the limited justiciability, there should be only limited, if any, practical difference. 
 
It could be concluded that an ECI-legislation would not be in contradiction with this condition due 
to the discretion of the institutions. 
 
Objective of the Community 
 
Community action is only allowed when it is directed towards the implementation of a treaty 
objective. What a treaty objective exactly implies is contested in the literature and in the ECJ case-
law. The majority view tends towards a broad interpretation, considering the objectives in Art. 2, 3 
und 4 as general community objectives and the objectives in several individual provisions as special 
objectives that justify action under Art. 308. The latter have preference over the general objectives. 
Objectives of the Treaty on European Union are not applicable.56 All tasks of the community 
constitute objectives.57 It is contested whether the objectives in the preamble constitute treaty 
objectives. The majority view seems to deny that the preamble constitutes objectives.58 However, 
the ECJ has frequently ruled  but not in explicit reference to Art. 308  several times in favour of 
regarding preamble objectives as treaty objectives.59 
 
The question is whether explicit or general treaty objectives exist that justify ECI legislation. 
Turning first to the explicit objectives the only possibility seems to be the Unions Citizenship (Art. 
17-22 TEC). The Unions citizenship constitutes the community as a political community. As 
already mentioned (see III.1), the Unions citizenship is designed as a dynamic concept that gives 
the Union the opportunity of strengthening citizen rights. Some commentators regard it as 
cornerstone of European integration.60 The periodical reporting is designed to give an overview 
about the state of the citizens rights and possibilities and necessities of their further development. 
The current treaty regulations on the Unions citizenship constitutes a minimum standard that has to 
be further developed.61 Thus far it constitutes a task, and a task constitutes an objective in European 
Community Law. In conclusion, there is an objective that could (and must) prove necessary to 
attain.62 
 
Use of competencies 
 
Art. 308 is a legal base for an ECI-legislation in the sense of Art. 5 (1) TEC. But such a legislation 
has also to conform with the principles of subsidiarity in its narrow sense (Art. 5 (2)) and the 
principle of proportionality (Art. 5 (3)). The first principle justifies action, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
                                            
55
 Bitterlich, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 10; Geiger, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 6. 
56
 This could have simplified this problem because democracy is explicitly mentioned there in Art. 6 TEU as a constitutive principle. 
57
 Streinz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 18; Rossi, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 10-20; Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 83-146; 
Bitterlich, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 7. Geiger, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 3-5, disagrees that Art. 2 constitutes treaty objectives. 
58
 Geiger, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 5; Streinz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 18; Bitterlich, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 7; Rossi, op. 
cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 19. Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 112-123, is in favour of the applicability of preamble objectives. 
59
 For an good overview see Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 118-119. 
60
 Kaufmann-Bühler, op. cit., Art. 22 EGV, RN 1. 
61
 Ibid; Kluth, op. cit., Art. 22 EGV, RN 2 citing supporting evidence. 
62
 It might also possible to use an objective in the TEC-preamble as justifying Community action under Art. 308. This will not be 
further analyzed because there is already a special treaty objective. 
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Community. However, it is not necessary to analyze whether an ECI-regulation might violate this 
principle. That is why it is only of relevance for areas which do not fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community. The ECI is within the exclusive competence of the community 
because it could be obviously regarded as belonging to the autonomy of the institutional system of 
the EU; the latter is an area within the exclusive competence of the Community.63 Even if one does 
not consider the ECI to be regarded as an exclusive community competence, it is hard to imagine 
how the empowerment of the Unions citizens regarding European policy can be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States. 
 
The proportionality principle - Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty - can only be discussed with regard to the specific content of 
the ECI legislation. This matter is beyond the scope of this study, but there is clearly not much need 
for binding requirements for the Member States, as the ECI deals primarily with the institutions of 
the Union. Only the method of signature gathering64 could be an issue for harmonization of Member 
States action. An ECI legislation would therefore be unlikely to be in conflict with the 
proportionality principle. 
 
All conditions of Art. 5 and Art. 308 have been fulfilled. It is also important to note that Art. 308 has 
been used quite frequently in the past. It should not construct an insurmountable barrier for 
achieving more participatory democracy in the Union.  
 
An ECI-legislation is legally possible. 
 
Legal effect 
 
Regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all Member States: whereas 
directives are only binding as to the result to be achieved and leave open to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods. The implementation can violate the national constitutions and  at 
least in Germany  be challenged by the national constitutional courts. The lawmaker is not entirely 
free in respect of the form of the legal act. According to the already mentioned proportionality 
principle he or she has to choose that form that interferes as few as possible with national 
competencies.65 
 
There are sound reasons for choosing the regulation as the appropriate form for an ECI-legislation. 
The ECI is part of the exclusive competencies of the Union, as it belongs to the autonomy of the 
institutional system. One of its most important aims it to enable transnational discussions and policy 
action. By its very nature, there is little interference with Member States competencies. Thus a 
directive would not be optimal because the substantive rules of the ECI (number of signatures, 
scope, significant number of countries, time frame, etc.) should be uniform. It would also imply 
further delay in the application of the ECI. The regulation is therefore the appropriate form of a legal 
act.66 
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 Zuleeg, M., in von der Groeben/Schwarze, op. cit., Art. 5 EGV, RN 8. 
64
 Especially in Germany there are discussion whether signatures should be gathered free (e.g. at public events, street gathering) or 
whether citizens have to go into official buildings (e.g. town halls) in order to sign. 
65
 Hetmeier, op. cit., Art. 249 EGV, RN 2. 
66
 This conclusion is also supported by the text of Art. I-47 (4) of the Constitutional Treaty because it speaks of European laws that 
should specify the procedure. In the concept of the Constitutional Treaty a European Law corresponds to the regulation whereby 
European Framework Laws correspond to directives, see Fischer, op. cit., p. 184; Evers, S., in Berg, C./Kampfer, C. (eds.): 
Verfassung für Europa, Der Taschenkommentar für Bürgerinnen und Bürger, 2004, p. 150. 
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One significant limitation arises with respect to the scope of an ECI legislation, the chosen form of a 
legal act notwithstanding. Art. 308 seems to justify only Community action; it´s not applicable for 
action of the European Union. The practical implications are that ECIs directed to, for example, the 
CFSP or to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters would not be admissible. But there is 
at least one regulation based on Art. 308 that deals with CFSP matters.67 This problem would not 
arise in the concept of the Constitutional Treaty because the TEC and TEU is merged into one single 
institutional framework, the different types of legal acts and procedures notwithstanding. 
 
Procedure 
 
Art. 308 requires a proposal of the Commission and unanimous action by the Council. The Parlia-
ment only needs to be heared. Convincing the Commission to present a draft regulation (thus far it 
has refused to take action) is therefore the first task and could become a  sizeable one. This will 
certainly depend on the fate of the Constitutional Treaty. If it is to be revived, the chances for an 
ECI legislation are quite bleak, as the very text of the new treaty includes the ECI. However, if the 
constitutional stalemate continues and no solution can be found, then there are good reasons for such 
an isolated approach. The German Council Presidency will be decisive for this issue. The unanimity 
principle means that the resistance of a single Member State could block the enactment of an ECI 
regulation. This is quite an important hurdle, but we should not forget that all Heads of States and 
Governments have already consented to the ECI during the Intergovernmental Conference 
negotiating the Constitutional Treaty. There is also an interesting academic debate whether the 
Council is obliged to take action once the conditions of Art. 308 have been fulfilled. While the ECJ 
has decided that the Council is not obliged,68 a minority view in the literature holds the opposite 
opinion. This is based on the wording, the Council shall and the apparent difference in the text of 
Art. 95 of the Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) - which served 
as a model for Art. 308 (then Art. 235) - giving the Council discretion - could.69 The majority 
view rejects this interpretation with reference to the ECJ-ruling and to the discretion of the 
Council.70 
 
The author shares the minority view. The Council is obliged to act once Community action proves 
necessary to attain. The wording of Art. 308 is instructive and explicitly excludes the discretion of 
the Council, in that the Council has to take action. However, the Council is not obliged to adopt a 
proposal from the Commission unaltered. 
 
Conclusion 
 
An ECI regulation is legally possible, would have binding force, and would enable initiators to 
challenge unfavourable decisions of the Commission before the ECJ. While Member States would 
be bound to a uniform procedure, there would be no interference with their sovereign powers. The 
regulation should make it clear that treaty amendments can be proposed by an ECI. The Council has 
to act once the Commission makes a proposal for a legal act. A regulation could be enacted much 
faster compared with primary law amendments. Some foreseeable drawbacks include the unanimity 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, Abl. 2001L 57/5. 
68
 Rossi, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 63. 
69
 Schwartz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 188-191. 
70
 Streinz, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 31; Rossi, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 63-64; Geiger, op. cit., Art. 308 EGV, RN 13. 
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requirement71 and the potentially limited scope of the instrument compared with the constitutional 
options. 
 
Enactment by an interinstitutional agreement 
 
The ECI might be integrated in an interinstitutional agreement. This option has already been 
presented in the so-called Voggenhuber-Duff-report of the European Parliament.72 Interinsti-
tutional agreements (IIA) are agreements between the Commission, Parliament and the Council. As 
of yet, they have no general legal basis in primary law; the draft Constitutional Treaty would have 
created one with Art. III-397.73 Their function is to regulate the details of the cooperation of the 
institutions. One of the main practical implications of IIA is to pave the way for subsequent treaty 
amendments. The European Parliament has also incrementally increased its  powers via this 
measure. They also served to contain institutional conflicts, e.g. in the budgetary procedure.74 
 
Would it be legally possible to establish the ECI by an IIA? IIA could neither change nor comple-
ment the treaties; furthermore they would have to be agreed upon by all three organs. They could 
not alter the vertical (between the Member States and the European Union) or horizontal (between 
the institutions) balance of power. IIA that give institutions powers without a basis in treaty law, and 
therefore amend the institutional balance, are illegal.75  
 
The creation of an ECI by an IIA should be able to conform to these hurdles. The ECI is neither 
shifting the power balance between the EU and the Member States nor between the institutions. 
Because the ECI respects the monopoly of legislative initiative of the Commission, there is also no 
shift of power between the citizens and the Commission. The agreement of all (primary) institutions 
is a political question. An IIA would therefore be legally possible and much faster compared to the 
other options analysed so far. 
 
However, there are very significant shortcomings of the IIA. One, is the very limited legal effect of 
an IIA. Only the concluding parties are bound by these agreements.76 Especially with respect to 
Member States, no obligations could be conferred. But this could become an issue when it comes to 
the questions of the type of signature gathering (see above). An IIA also could not create legal There 
are also political reasons that lead to a sceptical outlook on this option. It would be symbolically 
peculiar to integrate the citizens initiative into the interinstitutional structure of the EU. 
                                            
71
 Even if the Council is obliged to act, there is a problem with unanimity regarding the content of an ECI regulation. Unanimity 
would potentially lead to a kind of minimum consensus. 
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 Europäisches Parlament: Struktur, Themen und Kontext für die Bewertung der Debatte über die Europäische Union, Entschließung 
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 Hummer, op. cit.; Kaufmann-Bühler, op. cit., Vorbem. Art. 189-201, RN 5. 
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 Kaufmann-Bühler, op. cit., Art. 197, RN 12. But, according to Hummer, op. cit., even this internal binding nature is not always 
ensured, but this is not of deeper interest for this study. This is supported by the very text of the draft Constitutional Treaty (see FN 
73). 
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Participatory democracy is not a game between the institutions initiated by the citizens. It is (or 
should be, in my understanding) a right of the citizens to influence the policies of the EU. The 
enactment of an IIA, the possibility of publication in the Official Journal notwithstanding, is also 
much less transparent than the enactment of directives/regulations and especially than primary law 
amendments. 
 
Via an IIA, only an ECI light could be enacted that would leave citizens powerless in case of non-
action on the part of the Commission and violation of ECI procedures. The option is thus not 
recommended. 
 
Integration into the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
 
Another option would be to integrate the ECI into these rules of procedure of the Commission.77 
They are governing the internal affairs of the Commission. In the annex, there is already a Code of 
good administrative behaviour for staff of the European Commission in their relation with the 
public dealing with issues like access to documents or handling of citizen inquiries. The Rules of 
Procedure could be amended by a simple majority of the members of the Commission (Art. 219 
TEC and Art. 8 Rules of Procedure). There is already one case of precedence: in the Netherlands the 
citizens initiative was enacted in the rules of procedure of the Parliament. 
 
All counterarguments that have arisen regarding the interinstitutional agreements are also valid for 
the Commissions Rules of Procedure. They are neither binding for Member States, nor are 
enforceable by citizens.78 An additional problem is that only the role of the Commission regarding 
the treatment of ECI´s can be regulated that way. However, it might also be prudent to give the 
Council and the Parliament (limited) roles, e.g. the right of the citizens initiative also to be heard by 
these institutions once the Commission has decided to begin the legislative process. This would not 
be possible in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.79  
 
For the aforementioned reasons, this option would not be recommended. 
 
Conclusion 
 
All of the discussed options have their disadvantages and pitfalls; none of them is easy to achieve. 
The integration of the ECI into a mini-treaty is the best option if this treaty is strictly bound on 
undisputed, institutional reforms and paves the way for a general treaty reform/constitutional 
process. If this is not attainable, the enactment of an ECI-regulation is the next best option. All other 
options could not be recommended. 
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in court rulings. 
79
 Theoretically, the ECI could be integrated parallel into the rules of procedure of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. 
However, this would not cure the non-binding nature and the lack of enforceability. It would also lead to a intransparent and 
potentially incoherent procedure. 
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VI. Annex: Past and current campaigns invoking the European 
citizens initiative 
 
One Million 
Europeans 
Against Nuclear 
Power 
This campaign, organised by Atomstopp, Friends of the Earth 
Europe, Global 2000, Sortir du Nucléare, WISE, Woman for Peace, 
and supported by more than 350 NGOs, has gathered (as of 
24.10.06) more than 505,000 signatures against nuclear power in 
Europe.    
www.million-against-nuclear.net 
EU media 
regulation 
Initiative 
 
The idea of gathering one million signatures for media pluralism came 
out of an international conference on 23 April, 2005 in the European 
Parliament. This has been supported by MEP Michele Santoro (PSE, 
Italy). Since there is no follow-up-action on the website, the campaign 
itself has apparently not started yet.  
www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-
137649-16&type=News 
keywords.dsvr.co.uk/freepress/body.phtml?
category=news&id=993 
Campaign for 
one million 
signatures in 
favour of Union 
citizenship for 
all residents 
The National Assembly Against Racism (Great Britain) aims to gather 
one million signatures to grant Union Citizenship to all residents, 
regardless of nationality.  The organization also stipulates that 
regardless of the evolution of the Constitutional Treaty, they will 
nevertheless deliver the signatures to the various national 
governments, to the European Commission, and to the European 
Parliament.   
  
www.naar.org.uk/newspages/050421c.asp 
www.aedh.net/petition-million.htm 
 
Animal Welfare 
Initiative 
Endorsed and initiated by various Green parties, the campaign seeks 
to place restrictions on inhumane and unnecessarily long 
transportation of live animals in Europe.  They aim to gather one 
million signatures to add a clause on animal transport to an 
anticipated EU Constitutional Treaty.   
www.fyeg.org/index.php?option=content&ta
sk=view&id=90&Itemid=159                     
Initiative Pour 
la Justice  
The Right of 
Initiative of the 
Citizens of the 
European 
Community 
This cyber-campaign, directed to European Commission, European 
parliamentarians, heads of state and government and parliaments of 
the individual Member States, invokes the right (as stated in the draft 
constitution) of citizen initiative to propose eleven statements as basis 
of an Europe in freedom, security and justice. The petition was 
started by Chantal Cutajar, professor of criminal law at Strasbourg 
University and President of Le Droit pour la Justice, who launched 
this campaign on her website 9 March, 2005.  The campaign aims to 
gather one million signatures and is exclusively online. 
 
www.petition-europe-justice.com 
 
The One Seat 
Campaign 
 
Headed by Cecila Malmström (member of the European Parliament 
for the Swedish Liberal Party), the campaign strives to stop the 
travelling circus to Strasbourg.  As of 25.10.06, the petition has 
been signed more than 1,044,700 Europeans.    
www.oneseat.eu/ 
 
The Help Africa 
Petition 
 
 
This campaign, started in 2004 by British PM Michael Willis, aims to 
gather one million signatures calling for European financial support of 
people with AIDS in Africa. It is also mentioned that the ability to 
garner support for this cause is possible within the legal framework of 
the EU.  
www.helpafricapetition.com/  
 
European Civil 
Service 
 
Launched in April, 2006 by the European Movement France, this 
petition aims to gather one million signatures for a European Civil 
Service. This Service should allow every young European to engage 
in a project of solidarity in another Member state of the EU 
(European Movement Website). 
www.mouvement-europeen.org/ (url for 
signing the petition)  
 
www.europeanmovement.org 
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